INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is becoming more and more popular nowadays, where data is outsourced into the cloud. Its advantages are obvious: relief of the burden of storage management on data owners, universal data access with independent geographical locations, and avoidance of capital expenditure on hardware, software, personnel maintenance, etc. [1] .
However, outsourcing data leads to new security issues. The first issue is data integrity. [2] , [3] and [4] describe a wide range of both internal and external threats to data integrity. The second issue is unfaithful cloud server provider (CSP). Examples include CSP, for monetary reasons, reclaiming storage by discarding data that has not been or is rarely accessed [5] , or even hiding data loss incidents to maintain a reputation [6] .
To address these two issues, proofs need to be shown to data owners and users that the CSP stores the data, and the data is not modified by entities other than the data owners. We call this the storage correctness requirement, and call schemes designed for fulfilling the storage correctness requirement the proof-of-storage schemes.
Since data is stored on the cloud server (CS), instead of data owners (DO). Traditional cryptographic primitives for the purpose of data integrity protection can't be directly used (see [5] and [6] ) due to the high communication costs. That is, in traditional cryptographic primitives, integrity verification requires downloading data from the cloud server, which will lead to high Communication costs. Moreover, in cloud environment, the integrity check should be done in a make-before-access style, So that data corruptions should be detected before accessing the data. Compared with traditional cryptographic primitives, the auditing is a better choice for the storage correctness goal in cloud computing, and it is widely employed. By audit sampling, the data transmission cost can be reduced. By audit reporting, the data loss/tampering risk can be evaluated before accessing the data.
In [8] , Shacham describes three basic proof-of-storage schemes (i.e. a symmetric key based self-auditing scheme, a BLS based public auditing scheme, and a RSA based public auditing scheme), and proves them to be secure under the random oracle model and standard model.
In [7] , Wang defines the publicly auditable architecture for cloud data storage service. In the architecture, there are four different entities: DO, the user, CS, and the third party auditor (TPA). The DO still signs her data, but it is the TPA who audits the DO's data. The TPA has expertise and capabilities to assess cloud storage security. However, it may not have the privilege of data reading (i.e. the data blocks stored in the CS should be privacy-preserving to the TPA). Wang also summarizes the features of auditing schemes (i.e. Constant bandwidth cost, No online burden on data owner, Protecting data privacy, Data dynamics support and Batch auditing support).
Under this architecture, there are a lot of BLS [10] based auditing schemes in ensuring remotely stored data integrity based on different systems and security models [8] Current proof-of-storage schemes can provide integrity protection for cloud data very well, except a hindrance which blocks them from being widely deployed. That is, when a DO wants to change its private key, she has to download her data blocks and signatures, verify data integrity using the old key, re-sign data blocks using the new key, and upload data blocks/new signatures again. This will lead to high communication cost between the DO and the CS, and high computation cost on the DO.
To address it, this paper models the requirement of key-changing/signatureupdating, and designs a novel BLS based scheme. In our scheme, the CS will update the signatures instead of the DO, without knowing the new private key of the DO. In this way, the communication cost and the computation cost on the DO are both reduced.
GOALS AND MODELS

Design Goals
(1) Key-changing support. This goal is to allow the DO to change its private key to a random value.
(2) Signature-updating support. This goal is to allow the CS to update signatures instead of the DO, without knowing the DO's private key. (3) Block-level auditing support. This goal is to allow DO's data to be audited at block level before and after the key-changing and signature-updating processes.
System Model
The text of your paper should be formatted as follows:
Entities:
There are four kinds of entities involved in our scheme: the DO, the CS, the TPA and the user. The DO owns a large set of data blocks ( B ), and generates a signature ( i  ) for each data block ( i m B  ). The set of i  is denoted by  . The CS stores B and  . The TPA knows the metadata of data blocks on the CS, and audits data blocks. The user just uses auditing reports from the TPA, and we will not mention her in this paper. Algorithms: 
, and returns public key pk and private key sk of the DO. This algorithm is run by the DO, and the generated key pair is used for signing data blocks and auditing. . This algorithm is run by the DO for generating signatures. It takes as input sk , and B , and outputs  . Before and after the key-changing and signature-updating process, the DO uses the same signing algorithm for generating signatures for data blocks. But the signing key is different (i.e. 0 sk and 1 sk ).
This algorithm is run by the CS. It takes B ,  and chal (indices and challenges) as input, and outputs a data integrity proof P for the blocks specified by chal . Typically, P includes two parts: The part  is computed from B , and the part  is computed from  . Before and after the keychanging and signature-updating processes, the CS uses the same algorithm for generating proof. But the input signatures are different (i.e. 0  and 1  ).
VerifyProof pk P chal  . This algorithm can be run by either the DO or the TPA upon receipt of the proof P . It takes as input ( , , ) pk P chal , and outputs TRUE for correct proof, or FALSE otherwise. Before and after the key-changing and signature-updating processes, the CS uses the same algorithm for verifying proof. But the public key is different (i.e. 0 pk and 1 pk ).
THE SCHEME
Before presenting our scheme, we first give three definitions.
(1) Definition for data blocks. We assume the DO owns a set of files. Each file is divided into multiple blocks 1 , where name is the identifier that uniquely identifies the file that the block belongs to, and i is the block index in the file.
(3) Definition for pairing group. We denote the pairing group by ( ) BUP VerifyProof algorithms, except that the public and private keys used in those algorithms are different.
EFFICIENCY EVALUATION
To provide an intelligible explanation of the objective evaluation, we first give the following two assumptions.
-Assumption 1. We assume there are b data blocks to be signed and audited.
-Assumption 2. Signing algorithms used in current BLS based schemes such as Wang's scheme [15] , yang's scheme [16] , and Shacham's scheme [8] are similar to ours. So we assume the algorithm used by the DO for re-signing is the . () BUP Siggen algorithm. Note that before re-signing data blocks, the DO needs to verify the integrity for downloaded data blocks. This will lead to additional computation cost on the DO. The traditional way for integrity verification is using the public key and the pairing function. However, pairing function is costly. Considering the DO holds the private key 0  , the simple way for integrity verification is that the DO re-computes the signature using the . () BUP Siggen algorithm, and compares it with the signature downloaded from the CS. That is, for each data block, the DO needs to run the . () BUP Siggen algorithm twice during the signature-updating process. Now we begin to evaluate the computation cost of our scheme. 
CONCLUSION
Key-changing is a basic requirement for cryptography systems. However, for the cloud data auditing system, key-changing is very costly, because all the signatures of the DO must be updated accordingly. The traditional way for updating signatures is that the DO downloads the old files, verifies them, generates new signatures and uploads them to the CS again. This will put a heavy burden on the DO, and lead to high communication cost between the CS and the DO. To address it, this paper introduces a novel key-changing and signature-updating scheme that permits the cloud server to update signatures instead of the data owner. Its security features are analyzed, and its efficiency is evaluated. The results show that our scheme is secure and can reduce the computation cost on the data owner.
